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 A small manufacturing company, Kalamazoo Tank and Silo Co. (“KTS”), built its 
headquarters on the shores of the Kalamazoo River in the 1870’s.1  Today, several of the historic 
buildings remain.   Although the family finally sold most of the manufacturing aspects of the 
business, it leased the historic buildings to several local businesses.  Lured by, tax abatement 
programs and environmental redevelopment grants, the city of Kalamazoo offered the company a 
low sum to purchase the riverside property for redevelopment into a mixed-use condominium 
                                                 
1 Interview with Attorney for KTS. On file with author.  
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development.2  After the company refused the offer, Kalamazoo turned to its power of eminent 
domain.  
 Initially, the city asserted the mere economic redevelopment of the property as its basis 
for “public use.”  Realizing the weakness in asserting eminent domain based solely on pure 
economic development, given the case pending before the Michigan Supreme Court, the city 
later declared the property “blighted” and sought condemnation of the property under Michigan’s 
liberal statutes. Its plan was to turn it over to developers for construction.  The impudence of the 
blight designation is exacerbated by the fact that the city requested that KTS retain for their 
historical significance the very buildings the city later declared blighted.  Although KTS and 
Kalamazoo later settled, it was only after KTS was forced to expend significant sums on 
attorneys’ fees, including appealing the trial court’s denial of KTS’s request for a jury trial.3      
   Unconstrained by proper operation of market forces, cities across Michigan, and 
throughout America are using their powers of eminent domain and denoting homes, businesses, 
vacant land as “blighted,”4 pursuant to lenient redevelopment statutory schemes.5 Municipalities 
then condemn entire areas and turn them over to private developers for redevelopment for varied 
                                                 
2 For a collection of Kalamazoo’s other projects, including a discussion of the KTS project see Annual Report of 
Accomplishments City of Kalamazoo Brownfield Redevelopment Authority (2004) at 
www.redevelopkalamazoo.org/ upload_docs%2F2004AnnualReport.pdf. 
3  City of Kalamazoo v. KTS Indus. Inc., 687 N.W. 2d 318 (2004).  
4 Under Michigan Law, a “Blighted area means a portion of a municipality, developed or underdeveloped, improved 
or unimproved, with business or residential uses, marked by a demonstrated pattern of deterioration in physical, 
economic, or social conditions, and characterized by such conditions as functional or economic obsolescence of 
buildings or the area as a whole, physical deterioration of structures substandard building or facility conditions, 
improper or inefficient division or arrangement of lots and ownerships and streets and other open spaces, 
inappropriate mixed character and uses of the structures, deterioration in the condition of any public facilities or 
services or any other similar characteristics which endanger the health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the 
municipality, and which may include any buildings or improvements not in themselves obsolescent and any real 
property residential or nonresidential, whether improved or unimproved, the acquisition of which is considered 
necessary for rehabilitation of the area. It is expressly recognized that blight is observable at a stages of severity, and 
that moderate blight unremedied creates a strong probability that sever blight will follow. Therefore, the conditions 
that constitute blight are to be broadly construed to permit a municipality to make an early identification of problems 
and to take ready remedial action to correct a demonstrated pattern of deterioration and to prevent worsening of 
blight conditions.  Mich Stat. § 125.72(a).  
5 DANA BELINER, PUBLIC POWER, PRIVATE GAIN 4 (2002).  
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uses, including shopping malls, discount stores, casinos, hotels, and condominiums.6 The 
concept of blight is vague and its definition uncertain.7  Michigan’s current statutory scheme 
gives municipalities, like Kalamazoo, the freedom to condemn private property for 
redevelopment projects.  With such statutes, traditional rules of property protection are thrown 
out the window under the guise of protecting the “health, safety and welfare” of citizens.  While 
some private-to-private urban redevelopment projects are above board, with municipalities 
selecting areas for redevelopment that truly are blighted, and detrimental to the health, and 
welfare of the citizenry, what about the countless that abuse this power?  Some states have 
extensive statutory regulation over blight determinations.8 Under the current model, every 
potentially “blightable” piece of prime real estate is ripe for the picking by municipal authorities.  
 Although the Michigan Supreme Court may have saved public use from the theory of 
pure “economic revitalization” allowed into eminent domain by Poletown Neighborhood Council 
v. City of Detroit,9 with its decision in County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 10 the Michigan Legislature 
has left the possibility that economic redevelopment could return, cleverly disguised as 
something else. The “else” being economic redevelopment of “blighted” areas.  The Hathcock 
majority enumerated three situations in which condemned property may appropriately be given 
to a private entity: (1) where “public necessity of the extreme sort” requires collective action; (2) 
where the property remains subject to public oversight after transfer to a private entity; and (3) 
where the property is selected because of “facts of independent public significance,” rather than 
                                                 
6 BERLINER supra note 3 at 4. (noting that “cities love eminent domain because they can offer other peoples 
property in order to lure or reward favored developers. Developers love eminent domain because they don’t have to 
bother with negotiating for property).  
7 Colin Gordon, Blighting the Way: Urban Renewal, Economic Development, and the Elusive Definition of Blight, 
31 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 305, 305-06 (2004).  
8 See, e.g.  BERLINER, supra note 4 at 2 (noting that the states of South Carolina, Kentucky, North Carolina 
Illinois, Wyoming are more protective of property rights, at least on paper).  
9 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981). 
10 684 N.W.2d 765.  
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the interests of the private entity to which the property is eventually transferred.11  The third 
prong of this test refers to the power of a city or municipality to obtain property for 
redevelopment through a blight designation.12   
 Justice Weaver warned of possible abuse in her separate opinion in Hathcock, concurring 
in part, dissenting in part.13   In other states, especially those that declined to follow Michigan’s 
lead in Poletown Neighborhood Redevelopment Council v. City of Detroit, municipalities had to 
discover alternative ways in which to facilitate lucrative redevelopment projects.   One way in 
which they accomplished this goal was to declare an area “blighted” pursuant to lenient State 
redevelopment acts, condemn the property pursuant to their eminent domain power, and then 
transfer the property to a private developer.14 Justice Weaver noted several of these recent blight 
designations, which included findings that the homes involved did not have two car garages and 
had less than two bathrooms.15 Because of Poletown, Michigan’s blight jurisprudence is 
relatively minimal. Following Poletown, it was unnecessary to find a detriment to the public 
health, safety or welfare, or a “fact of independent public significance” to take private property 
for transfer to a private party. However, given the new limits of Hathcock, the concept of 
“blight” is likely to come into the forefront.      
  This foreshadowing has special significance given Michigan’s current blight statute. 
Once recent article surveying state statutes governing the power use of eminent domain in 
                                                 
11 County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 471 Mich 445, 684 N.W.2d 765, 783 (2004) (quoting Poletown, Ryan, J., 
dissenting). 
12 Id.  
13 Id. at 797 ( Weaver, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“[i]f, instead of the common understanding of 
“public use” future courts rely on “facts of independent public significance” to determine whether a condemnation is 
for a “public use” then it is easy to imagine how the people’s limit on the exercise of eminent domain might be 
eroded.”).  
14 See generally, BERLINER, supra note 4; Gordon, supra note 7; George Lefcoe, Finding the Blight That’s Right 
for California Redevelopment Law, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 991 (2000). Jennifer J. Kruckeberg, note, Can Government 
Buy Everything?: The Takings Claues and the Erosion of the “Public Use” Requirement, 87 MINN. L. REV. 543 
(2002).  
15 Hathcock,  684 N.W.2d at 797 ( Weaver, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) 
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redevelopment noted that Michigan, along with six other states, only require a finding of one out 
of a list of factors to obtain a blight designation.16 Furthermore, the Michigan Statute requires 
that its blight factors be “broadly construed.”17  Although Michigan’s existing blight statutory 
scheme was already one of the most permissive in the country, the legislature was not satisfied.  
In 2002, Detroit House Representative Andrew Richner introduced HB 4028, which amended 
existing law to make it easier to turn blighted property over to developers.18  This bill was 
introduced following Detroit’s unsuccessful attempts to clear the riverfront to make room for all 
three Detroit casinos.19 Governor Engler, Michigan’s Governor at the time, signed the bill into 
law in May of 2002.   
 This Comment argues that Michigan’s current Blight Statutory regime is too permissive 
and allows for abuse of the power of eminent domain. A new blight statute is necessary to 
prevent municipalities from procuring sham designation of blight, which are merely a guise 
under which the municipality transfers private property to a private developer, effectively 
twisting the third prong of Hathcock for its own pecuniary gain.   Section I examines the history 
of “blight, and “blight” standards in federal jurisprudence. Section II outlines the current state of 
blight eminent domain doctrine in Michigan.  Section III analyzes Blighted Area Rehabilitation 
statutes promulgated other jurisdictions as well as Michigan’s current act. Finally, section IV 
develops a new Michigan Blighted Area Redevelopment Act and discusses why it is a necessary 
step on Michigan’s road back to traditional understanding of public use.       
      
                                                 
16 James S. Burling, Blight Light, SH053  ALI-ABA 43, January 9-11 2003.  
17 Blighted Area Rehabilitation Act, 33 P.A. 1945,  M.C.L. § 125.71.  
18 Development of Blighting Propety, 2002 P.A. 27, M.C.L. § 125.2801. This act  “establishe[ed] a procedure for 
municipalities to designate individual lots or structures as blighting; to purchase or condemn blighting property; and 
to transfer blighting property to developers.”;  See BERLINER, supra note 4 at 100 (noting that this bill “makes it 
easier to condemn individual properties and transfer them to private developers”). 
19 BERLINER, supra note 4 at 100.  
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I. BACKGROUND  
A. Early Urban Redevelopment Movement   
 
 Current ideas surrounding blight and urban redevelopment have evolved from those held 
by proponents of the tenement reform and slum-clearance movements of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century.20  The first redevelopment efforts focused on the housing plight of the 
poor.  At that time, many poor American citizens and immigrants lived tenements or run down 
“slum” housing.21  Early writers defined “slums” as “a residential area in which the housing is so 
deteriorated, so substandard or so unwholesome as to be a menace to the health, safety, morality 
or welfare of the occupants.”22  Slum and tenement areas housed 600 to 1000 persons per acre, 
often without windows, toilets, bath facilities or hot water.23 Infested with rodents and other 
vermin, tenements were rotting, filled with garbage and pollution and were often structurally 
unsound.24  These conditions in turn, according to proponents of reform, bred immorality, illness 
and disease.25  As one early writer noted, tenement houses were “totally unfit to be shelter for the 
lower animals.”26 Early efforts focused on piecemeal reform of the squalor and disease-ridden 
tenements and were often through private efforts and state housing law reform.27    Despite these 
efforts, however, reformers made no significant dent in ridding the cities of slums.   During the 
                                                 
20ROBERT M. FOGLESON, DOWNTOWN: ITS RISE AND FALL 1880-1950 323-43 (2001). 
21 Id.  
22 JAMES FORD, 1 SLUMS AND HOUSING 13 (1936).  
23 FOGLESON, supra note 20 at 323-43.  
24 Id.; See also Edith Elmer Wood, Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works, Housing Division Bulletin 
No. 1, Slums and Blighted Areas in the United States (1936).  
25 Contaminated water let to typhoid fever. Wood, supra note 24 at 9.  Windowless rooms increased the chance of 
rickets in infants. Id at 7. Infant mortality in some sections reached including common cold, sore throat, influenza, 
diphtheria, scarlet fever, measles, mumps, chickenpox, whooping cough, cerebrospinal fever, infantile paralysis, 
pneumonia, and tuberculosis. Id.  
26 FOGLESON, supra note 20 at 322, (quoting B.O. Flower, The Tenement House Curse: Some Side Lights on the 
Tenement House Evil,  ARENA 674) 
27 Originating by reforming local laws, see eg. New York Tenement House Law of 1901. See also JACOB RIIS, 
HOW THE OTHER HALF LIVES (1893).  
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twenties and thirties, inspired by European housing reform, particularly in England,28 reformers 
began to focus on large-scale solutions.29 
   Fueled by the findings of the 1930 census that indicated over 1/3 of Americans lived in 
substandard housing, (i.e. one or two room windowless apartments and farmhouses without 
plumbing or electricity), the Hoover administration commissioned the Housing Division of the 
Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works. 30 The Housing Division was in charge of 
pioneering the housing reform movement.31 Given an initial grant of $150,000,000, the agency 
initially sought to work with private developers on a limited dividend basis. 32  However, after 
determining “that the incentive for private endeavor along those lines could never be sufficient to 
accomplish the ends in view” the Housing Commission undertook projects on its own.33   The 
bulletin assembled by the agency in support of its actions contains surveys conducted on housing 
conditions throughout the United States.34  The bulletin additionally contains case studies of several 
successful slum-redevelopment projects in New York and England.35  
 In support of the government involvement in such issues, the bulletin concluded by 
noting that the study established connection between housing and the health safety and welfare 
                                                 
28 Reform in England was spurred by Public Heath Act of 1848 the Housing of the Working Classes Act of 1890. 
See BAUER ET AL, THE FUTURE OF CITIES AND URBAN REDEVELOPMENT (Coleman Woodbury ed. 
1953). 
29 Wood supra note 24 at vii. (“The manuscript closes with a discussion of the beneficial results of slum clearance 
and rehousing, citing particularly the success of a number of such undertakings in Great Britain.”).  
30 Id.  
31 Id.  
As an explanation to the reasons for development of the agency, the foreword notes “In 
Studying means of advancing the President’s forward-looking policies of rehabilitating our 
nations, the problem of providing adequate homes and living conditions  for America’s lower-
income earners presented itself prominently. As a result, and distinct from those other Federal 
agencies created to save homes from foreclosure, or to arrange better of new construction and 
repairs, the Housing Division of the Public Works Administration was established.  
 Id. at vii-viii.  
32 For those who are curious, what cost $150,000,000 in 1935 would cost $1,970,967,062 in 2003. The Inflation 
Calculator at http://www.westegg.com/inflation/infl.cgi.  The agency was granted an additional $130,000,000 for 
projects the following year. Wood, supra note  24 at x.  
33  Wood, supra note 24 
34 See generally Id.  
35 Id. 
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of the public and a conclusion that these conditions constitute a national emergency requiring 
assistance of the national government.36  After the federal government demolished slums under 
this redevelopment model, improved housing was built in the same location, suitable for those 
who were displaced.37 These ideals became the foundation for future federal housing acts.  As 
private financing was unable or unwilling, proponents argued, use of federal and state police 
power was necessary to lift the poor up out of the dregs of society through improved housing, 
thereby improving society as a whole.38  The driving force of great social need behind this 
movement, however, gave way to a different model. 
B.  “Blight” and the First Federal Housing Acts  
  
 In 1935, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the federal government had no police power to 
condemn properties for low-cost housing and slum clearance.39  In support of its decision, the 
court concluded “[i]n the exercise of its police power, a state may do those things which benefit 
the health, morals, and welfare of its people, but the federal government has no such power 
within the states.”40  Fearful of review by the then conservative Supreme Court, Whitehouse 
                                                 
36 Id. at x.  
  (1) The close connection between housing and health, safety morals, and family welfare 
(2) The vast extent in the United States of housing sufficiently bad to exert an acutely 
deteriorating influence in those respects  
(3) The inescapable conclusion that this condition constitutes a national emergency in which 
only the national Government (with the cooperation of State and local housing authorities) 
can cope 
(4) The impossibility of the evils being corrected by private enterprises either working for 
maximum profit or accepting limited dividends. 
(5) That a large-scale effort to demolish slums and replace them with good low-rental 
housing just at this time would have the additional effect of providing greatly needed work 
and building trades, thus meeting another even more urgent national emergency.  
Id.   
37 FOGLESON, supra note 20 at 351-52.  
38 BAUER supra note 28.  
39 United States v. Certain Lands in City of Louisville, 78 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1935).  
40 Id.  
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advisors elected not to pursue the issue further.41  Following this decision, the modern model of 
the federal urban renewal act was born.  
 The United States Housing Act of 1937,42 passed in response to the sixth circuit ruling, 
decentralized the slum-clearing movement, placing the federal government solely in the role of 
financier and states and municipal housing agencies in charge of the actual condemnation and 
redevelopment.43   The Act’s general purpose and mandates followed along those of its 
predecessor, the Housing Division.44  This act was focused primarily on clearing the worst slums 
and rebuilding proper housing to replace them.  The statute was there mention of “blight.”45  The 
focus of subsequent Housing Acts would prove to be much broader.  
 Although incorporated within many early state redevelopment acts, including the District 
of Columbia, “blight” emerged as an official trigger for redevelopment at the federal level 
through the federal Housing Act of 1949.46 The Act gave cities powers to eliminate “substandard 
and other inadequate housing through the clearance of slums and other blighted areas.”47    
Although included within the statute, the legislature did not define “blight.” The use of the term 
                                                 
41 Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private Uses of Eminent Domain. 
21 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 1, 24 (2003).  
42 42 U.S.C. § 1404 (1937) 
43  § 1404  
 (“AN ACT To provide financial assistance to the States and political subdivisions thereof for the 
elimination of unsafe and insanitary housing conditions, for the eradication of slums, for the 
provision of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for families of low income, and for the reduction of 
unemployment and the stimulation of business activity, to create a United States Housing Authority, 
and for other purposes.”). 
44 § 1404; see also Gordon, supra note 7 at 310.  
45 FOGLESON, supra note 20 at 351-52; BAUER, supra 28.  
46 Housing Act of 1949, Public Law 171, 81st Cong 1949.   Catherine Bauer, a prominent critic of urban 
redevelopment, asserted that the 1949 Act passed without fanfare due to the wide base of supporters, each with 
divergent ideas of its purpose.  BAUER, supra note 28 at 9. To proponents of original slum-clearance movement, it 
was merely another way to rid America of substandard living conditions. Id.  To the newly emerging proponents of 
“urban redevelopment,” the act served as a tool to save central business areas, stop falling property values and clear 
slums without building housing suitable for those same individuals to return. Id. Finally, city developers viewed the 
act as a tool to reorganize their city and remove inefficient uses of land. Id.  
47 Housing Act of 1949, Public Law 171, 81st Cong 1949.  
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“blight” first emerged in the early 1910’s amidst discussions surrounding the cause of slums.48 
Some viewed blight as the precursor of the slum, a dreaded cancer that slowly spread unless 
discovered early and removed. 49  Others thought blight was an economic rather than social 
problem, indicated by falling property values.50  
 In addition to its more expansive language, the Act did not require that municipalities 
replace housing torn down with suitable housing for those displaced by the clearance.51  The act 
also allotted substantial federal monies to provide loans “[t]o assist local communities in 
eliminating their slums and blighted areas and in providing … opportunity for the redevelopment 
… by private enterprise.”52  With these changes, the act essentially gave municipalities free 
range to pursue myriad redevelopment options, and facilitated a change in purpose for the urban 
development movement.  As one author noted, “if it was hard to define blighted districts, it was 
easy to find them.”53     Utilizing the subjective nature of “blight,” eager municipal bodies and 
central city business owners began to see a different use for this newfound power.  Central 
business districts were declining because of decentralization and large mass exodus to the 
suburbs.54 Frustrated with poor public transportation and traffic jams, those individuals who once 
came downtown for all of their shopping and business needs were content to patronize branch 
offices and local suburban stores.55  Lower income, racially integrated neighborhoods often 
surrounded the central business districts. Although not “slums” under any definition of the word, 
the homes were often older and less maintained then their suburban cousins, and residents were 
                                                 
48 Gordon, supra note 7 at 309-310.  
49 FOGLESON, supra note 20 at 349 
50 Id. at 351-52. 
51 Housing Act of 1949, Public Law 171, 81st Cong 1949. 
52 Housing Act of 1949, Public Law 171, 81st Cong 1949. 
53 FOGLESON, supra note 20 at 351-52. 
54 Id.  
55 Id.  
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often fiscally unable to patronize the large downtown department stores.56  By ridding the central 
business district of the ugly ring surrounding it, planners argued, and replacing the area with 
homes for individuals who are able to patronize downtown establishments, the downtown 
districts would thrive again.57  But one question remained: could this new model survive 
constitutional scrutiny?  
 In 1954, the Supreme Court answered with a resounding “yes.”  In line with the trend of 
upholding economic regulation legislation, the Court upheld the taking as a “public use” 58 In 
Berman, Property owners challenged the District of Columbia’s taking of their property pursuant 
to the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945.59 Congress promulgated the 
Redevelopment Act to allow the District of Columbia to eliminate substandard housing and 
redevelop obsolescent portions of the city through assemblage, eminent domain or otherwise.60   
This power was extended to slums, blighted areas, blighting factors or causes of blight.61  
 The level of underdevelopment in the area in question was significant. According to 
reports, approximately 60% of the dwellings were still using outhouses and had no baths, over 
                                                 
56 Id.  
57 Id. at 349. For an interesting analogy see Herbert J. Gans, The Failure of Urban Renewal in URBAN RENEWAL: 
THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY 537 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1966). 
 Suppose that the government decided that jalopies were a menace to public safety and a blight on the beauty 
of our highways, and therefore took them away from their drivers. Suppose then, that to replenish the supply 
of automobiles, it gave these drivers a hundred dollars each to buy a good used car and also made special 
grants to general Motors, Ford, and Chrysler to lower the cost-although not necessarily the price-of Cadillacs, 
Lincolns, and Imperials by a few hundred dollars. Absurd as this may sound, change the jalopies into slum 
housing, and I have described, with only slight poetic license, the first fifteen years of a federal program called 
urban renewal. 
Id.  
See also MARTIN ANDERSON, THE FEDERAL BULLDOZER  (1964)  
This latter “urban renewal” movement, however, could not peacefully coexist with its slum-clearance 
background.  “[W]hereas one of the prime purposes of urban renewal is to improve housing conditions for all 
income groups, in reality it improves housing conditions for the high income groups and lowers it for the low 
income groups.”57 By evicting the poor and enticing the wealthy, “the federal urban renewal program makes it 
possible for local renewal officials to create a new neighborhood of an entirely different character than that of 
the old neighborhood.”     
58 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1937).  
59  Berman v. Parker 348 U.S. 26 (1954).  For a thought-provoking discussion of the effects of Berman on the Civil 
Rights movement see Pritchett, supra, note 41 at 44. 
60 Berman, 348 U.S. at 28-29 (1954) (quoting District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945, 28 U.S.C. § 1253). 
61 Id.  
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80% lacked wash basins and were without central heat, and approximately 30% had no 
electricity.62  However, plaintiff’s property, although located in this area, was not residential or 
in substandard condition.63 It was a commercial department store, included in the redevelopment 
project based only on the fortuitousness of its location.  
 The Supreme Court concluded that the “plan to eliminate not only slums as narrowly 
defined by the District Court but also the blighted areas that tend to produce slums. . . .” 
including those buildings which standing by themselves are unoffending is completely within the 
purview of congressional police power.64  And, “[o]nce the object is within the authority of 
Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is clear. For the power of 
eminent domain is merely the means to the end. . . . nothing in the Fifth Amendment Stands in its 
way.” 65  With that, the Supreme Court sent a message that judicial review was minimal, and 
congress was free to do as it wished to achieve its housing and urban redevelopment goals.66   
 In the 1960’s many critics spoke out against the urban redevelopment movement and the 
waste and overreaching it fostered.67  This sharp criticism and lack of concrete results culminated 
in the retooling of the federal urban redevelopment model.68 Although federal funds dried up in 
the 1970’s, following these reforms States continued to follow this model and utilize the powers 
of eminent domain to redevelop their cities.69   
                                                 
62 Id. at 26, 30. 
63 Id. at  26, 31.  
64 Id. at 26, 34-35.   
65 Id. at 33.  
66 This goal was affirmed in Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff,  467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984). To satisfy the Public Use 
Clause, a taking need only be "rationally related to a conceivable public purpose." Id. at 241. "The 'public use' 
requirement is thus coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers." Id. 
67 Pritchett, supra note 41at 48 (noting that “the movement against urban renewal was led by Jane Jacobs, whose 
best-selling critique of urban redevelopment The Death and Life of Great American Cities . . . argued  that the 
diversity of cities was central to their survival”) (citing JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT 
AMERICAN CITIES 5 (1993) (1st ed Random House 1961). See also e.g.  ANDERSON, supra note 57.  
68 Pritchett, supra note 41 at 48 (noting that “[t]he urban renewal program was terminated by the Housing and 
Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5301 (1994)). 
69 Pritchett, supra note  41 at 48; see also Gordon, supra note 7 at 313 (noting that with the absence of federal 
funding, States adopted Tax Increment Financing to fill the void). For a discussion of Tax Increment Financing in 
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 Soon, the Supreme Court will add a new chapter to its eminent domain jurisprudence. 
Although Kelo v. City of New London,70 argued in February 2005, challenged the 
constitutionality of pure economic takings, its repercussions will assuredly be far reaching on the 
doctrine of eminent domain as a whole.  
C. Evolution of Blight in Michigan  
 
 Michigan’s first statute addressing the urban housing crises appeared in 1934. In order to 
meet the requirements for participation under the National Industrial Recovery Act, which 
allocated spending for low cost housing and slum-clearance, each state was required to have 
appropriate legislation.71 The Michigan legislature held an emergency session, and passed the 
Michigan Housing Act of 1933.  The act applied to cities and other municipalities with a 
population of over 500,000, authorizing them to “purchase acquire, construct, maintain, operate, 
improve, extend, and/or repair housing facilities and to eliminate housing conditions which are 
detrimental to the public peace, health, safety, morals, and/or welfare.”72  
 In New York City Housing Authority v. Miller73, the New York court of appeals held that 
condemnation of blighted properties for slum clearance constituted a public benefit and was 
therefore a public purpose.74 Following this decision, many states revamped their redevelopment 
                                                                                                                                                             
Michigan, see Joseph F. Luther, comment, Tax Increment Financing: Municipalities Avoiding Voter Accountability, 
1987 DET. C. L. REV. 90.   
70 843 A.2d 500 (Conn. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 27 (Sept. 28, 2004) (No. 04-108).  
71 National Industrial Recovery Act, title 2. 50 Stat. 888, 42 U.S.C § 1401 et seq (1932).  
72 In re Brewster Street Housing Project, 289 N.W. 493, 406 (1939) (quoting Michigan Housing Act, 1933 P.A. 18). 
73 270 N.Y. 333, 338 -339 (N.Y. 1936). 
74 New York City Housing Authority v. Muller  270 N.Y. 333, 338 -339 (N.Y. 1936) The pertinent language of the 
statute was as follows:  
“in certain areas of cities of the state there exist unsanitary or substandard housing conditions owing to over-
crowding and concentration of population, improper planning, excessive land coverage, lack of proper light, air 
and space, unsanitary design and arrangement, or lack of proper sanitary facilities; that there is not an adequate 
supply of decent, safe, and sanitary dwelling accommodations for persons of low income; that these conditions 
cause an increase and spread of disease and crime and constitute a menace to the health, safety, morals, welfare, 
and comfort of the citizens of the state, and impair economic values; that these conditions cannot be remedied 
by the ordinary operation of private enterprise.” 
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statutes and adopted the broad language legitimized by the decision.75 Additionally, fearful that 
the courts would hold these new statutes unconstitutional, many states strove to provide broad 
support under police powers for the necessity of such statutes. 76 Michigan’s housing statute was 
one of many which adopted this broad language.77 
1. Michigan Supreme Court Approves Blight  
 During this era, the Michigan Supreme Court had several opportunities to review the 
relevant housing redevelopment acts promulgated by the legislature.78  The first analysis by the 
Court on the constitutionality of the slum clearance movement came in its 1939 decision in In Re 
Brewster Street Housing Site in City of Detroit.79  In Brewster, the Michigan Supreme Court 
upheld the constitutionality of the Michigan Housing Act.80  Similar to the plaintiffs in Berman, 
(although decided prior to Berman) the property of the Brewster plaintiffs was merely 
fortuitously in the path of the slum redevelopment area, and not part of the slums themselves.  
Notably, the initial condemnation petition only indicated that the acquisition was necessary to 
                                                 
75 Comment, Corporate Prerogative “Public Use” and a People’s Plight: Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City 
of Detroit, 1982 Det. C. L. Rev. 907, 913.  
76  Pritchett, supra note 41 at 16, 22 (2003).  
77 Blighted Areas Rehabilitation Act, 1944 P.A. 344.  
78  In addition to the cases noted in the text see In Re Edward J. Jeffries Homes Housing Project, 11 NW.2d 272 
(1943). 78 In Jeffries,  the Michigan Supreme Court received another opportunity to comment on the issue.  The 
housing deficiencies in this area were not nearly as dilapidated as those in the Brewster street projects.   As trial, the 
city presented what was essentially a public policy argument, through testimony on the social effects of clearing and 
successful reduction of crime and disease in other areas.  Id. at 277. Jurors were given a tour of the Brewster street 
housing project, as well as tours of the area at question in trial. Id.  Although the plaintiffs noted that the city failed 
to present specific evidence on the health conditions and delinquency of the area, or traffic accidents from the 
irregular and narrow streets, jurors nonetheless  concluded that the jury found that it was necessary to acquire the 
land for slum clearance and low-cost housing.  Id.  As the jury decided such, the court noted that it was unnecessary 
to “decide whether a municipality can validly condemn property where the main purpose may be better housing, but 
slum clearance is also involved.” Id. at 287.  For photographs of the recently demolished Jeffries Projects see 
http://www.angelfire.com/de2/detroitpix/Jeffries1.html. 
79 289 N.W. 493 (1939).  The Brewster Street project was designated as the African American housing project. A 
similar project was constructed for whites, but housing shortages forced integration, which led to the 1943 race riots 
in Detroit. Vivian M. Baulch and Patricia Zacharias DET. NEWS at  
http://info.detnews.com/history/story/index.cfm?id=185&category=events. 
80 1933 P.A. 18. This act provided that “any city or incorporated village having a population of over 500,000 is 
authorized ‘to purchase, acquire, construct, maintain, operate, improve, extend, and/or repair housing facilities and 
to eliminate housing conditions which are detrimental to the public peace, health, safety, morals, and/or welfare.” In 
re Brewster, 289 N.W. at 497-498.   
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construct housing facilities for persons of low income.81 Only at trial did the city add “and for 
slum clearance.” 82  In concluding that there was no such limitation on the State’s power for 
slum-clearance, the Court relied on the power of the State to take property to build jails to protect 
the public from criminals, to build hospitals beneficial to the health of the people, and to build 
facilities for the control of juvenile delinquency.83 Similarly, “there seems to be no reason why 
the State, in the exercise of its police power, may not …condemn property for what may be 
termed slum-clearance purposes because such property may be a menace to the health, peace and 
safety of the inhabitants of the city other than those who occupy the premises.”84  
 In In re Slum Clearance85, the Michigan Supreme further expanded the definition of 
public use.  In Slum Clearance, the Court concluded that subsequent sale of condemned slum 
properties to private parties did not violate the public use clause of the Michigan constitution.86 
Such a transfer, the court noted, was merely incidental to the public purpose of slum clearance.87  
In step with the national urban redevelopment movement, Michigan municipalities used these 
powers to create new urban centers.  The power to eminent domain appeared almost limitless, 






                                                 
81 Id. at 499.  
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 501.  
84 Id. at 501. 
85 In re Slum Clearance in City of Detroit, 50 N.W. 2d 340 (1951).  
86 Id. 
87 Id.  
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2. Michigan’s Expansion and Retraction of the Definition of  Public Use 
 In Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit88, the court conflated the definition 
of “public use” with that of “public purpose,” and held that demolition of a non-blighted ethnic 
neighborhood and subsequent transfer to a private company for pure economic redevelopment 
was sufficient to constitute public use.89  The Poletown Court rejected plaintiffs request that the 
court distinguish between the term “use” and “purpose,” concluding that “the terms have been 
used interchangeably in Michigan statutes and decisions in an effort to describe the protean 
concept of public benefit.”90  The court then essentially twisted plaintiff’s usage of “use” and 
“purpose,” and asserted that “[t]here is no dispute about the law. All agree that condemnation for 
a public use or purpose is permitted.”91 The court reached this conclusion, although plaintiffs 
obviously challenged the pure private transfers of condemned land for the purpose of general 
economic development.   Justices Fitzgerald and Ryan sharply criticized this determination, with 
Justice Fitzgerald pointing out “[w]hat constitutes a public purpose in a context of governmental 
taxing and spending power cannot be equated with the use of that term in the context of eminent 
domain.”92 
 The Michigan Supreme Court finally attacked this line of reasoning in County of Wayne 
v. Hathcock.93  In Hathcock, the County of Wayne sought to condemn several properties for 
inclusion in a planned technology park.94 After first determining that the economic revitalization 
in question satisfied the broader statutory definition of “public purpose,” the court analyzed the 
                                                 
88 304 NW.2d 455 (Mich. 1981), overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W. 2d 765 (Mich. 2004).  
89 Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 455.  
90 Id.  The court then essentially twisted plaintiff’s usage of “use” and “purpose,” and asserted that “[t]here is no 
dispute about the law. All agree that condemnation for a public use or purpose is permitted.” Id. at 458-59.  
91 Id. at 458-59 (emphasis added).  
92 Id. at 463.  
93  684 N.W. 2d 765 (Mich. 2004).  
94 Hathcock, 684 N.W. 2d at 770.  
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requirements of “use” under Art. 10, section 2 of the Michigan constitution.95   The court 
rejected naked economic redevelopment as a “public use,” relying primarily on Justice Cooley’s 
rejection of a similar purported “public use” asserted in support of the Mill Acts, which grave 
Mill Owners the power of eminent domain to flood the properties of private individuals.96   With 
this rejection, the court relegated Poletown to an unfortunate blip in Michigan eminent domain 
jurisprudence, noting “after all, if one’s ownership of private property is forever subject to the 
government’s determination that another private party would put one’s land to better use, then 
the ownership of real property is perpetually threatened by the expansion plans of any large 
discount retailer” 97 Unfortunately, given Michigan’s blight statutory scheme, Michigan residents 






                                                 
95 “[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation therefor being first made or 
secured in a manner prescribed by law.” Mich Const. Art 10 § 2.  
96 As Justice Cooley explained:  
Undoubtedly there may arise circumstances under which it would be convenient if a power to 
condemn lands for mill purposes might be exercised, but they are so rare that a stretch of 
governmental power in order to provide for them would be more harmful than beneficial. It would 
under any circumstances be pushing the authority of government to extreme limits; and unless the 
reasons for it were imperative, would be likely to lead to abuses rather than tend to the promotion 
of the general interest, and to breed discords where, in the absence of such legislation, moderate 
counsels and final agreement might have prevailed. If in individual instances obstacles are 
encountered in the unreasonable objections of individual land owners, the rare instance cannot 
justify a general law which would be likely to breed as many grievances as it would cure, for 
legislation of this sort is always grievous when no great necessity justifies it; and it is always an 
invasion of liberty and of right when one is compelled to part with his possessions on grounds 
which are only colorable. A person may be very unreasonable in insisting on retaining his lands; 
but half the value of free institutions consists in the fact that they protect every man in doing what 
he shall choose, without the liability to be called to account for his reasons or motives, so long as 
he is doing only that which he has a right to do. 
Ryerson v. Brown,  1877 WL 7142, *5  (Mich. 1877).  
97  Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d  at  787.  
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II. REDEVELOPMENT STATUTORY SCHEMES   
 A recent survey of redevelopment statutes in the fifty states found three main blight 
statute methodologies.98  Although each state differs, and some have unique approaches, the 
categories are useful for analysis.99  
A. Approaches Found Within the Various State Statutes  
 The first approach was termed the “single impact test.” Under this approach, the statute 
lists factors for assessing whether it is appropriate to redevelop the area.100 The level of detriment 
varies, with some requiring five factors and others, as in Michigan, requiring only one factor.101  
The focus of factors differs as well, with some states focusing solely on detriment to public 
health, safety or welfare, and others focusing solely on whether the conditions have an adverse 
impact on development, economic vitality, or social welfare, and some, like Michigan, which use 
a combination of both.102 In States that use the single impact factor test, the most important 
distinction is the number of detrimental factors required for a blight designation.103  
 The next approach is a multi-factor approach. According to the author of the study, it is 
the most widely used approach in the nation.104  These states typically require that blight 
conditions similar to those in the single factor approach be a “menace” to the public health, 
                                                 
98 James S. Burling, Blight Light SH053 ALI-ABA 43 (Janaury 9-11 2003).  
99 Id. at 48.  
100 Id.  One author grouped these factors into the following categories:  (1) structural defects (2) health hazards; (3) 
Faulty or obsolescent planning; (4) Taxation issues; (5) Lack of necessity amenities and utilities; (6) Condition of 
title; (7) Character of the neighborhood (8) Presence of blighted open areas; (9) Declared Federal and State disaster 
areas; (10) Economic use of the land; (11) Presence of vacant lots and abandoned buildings and (12) Physical and 
Geological factors. Hudson Hayes Luce, The Meaning of Blight: A Survey of Statutory and Case Law, 35 Real Prop. 
Prob & Tr. J. 389, 414-15 (2000).  
101 Burling, supra note 98 at 49.  
102 Id. at 49. 
103 Id.  
104 Id.  
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safety and welfare, along with having an adverse impact on development or the general 
economic welfare of the community.105  
 The final approach utilizes both single and multifactor approaches depending on the 
severity of the condition and the location of the development.106  For example, in developed and 
residential areas, the single test approach is utilized. However, these jurisdictions strengthen the 
“blight” factors, requiring the condition of the area to be conductive to ill health, transmission of 
disease, infant mortality, juvenile delinquency and crime to be detrimental to the health, safety 
and welfare of the public.107  For other areas, the multifactor test is utilized, looking at a list of 
detriment to the health safety and welfare along with adverse economic impact.108 
 Different aspects of State statues strive to protect different interests.  While the single 
factor requirement in the single impact test is necessarily more deferential to the redevelopment 
agency, there are great differences between the degree to which property owners are protected in 
the multi-factor and combination tests.109   In addition to multiple factors, some state statutes 
provide for additional safeguards.  Texas requires that blight designations go to a vote before its 
citizens.110  North Carolina mandates that any property owner faced with a condemnation be 
entitled to reasonable fees for the attorney of his choosing.111 Washington requires that an 




                                                 
105 Id.   
106 Id.  
107 Id.  
108 Id. at 50.  
109 Id.  
110 Tex. Gov’t Code § 2306.004 (2002).  
111 N.C. Gen Stat. § 169A-503.  
112 Wash. Rev. Code § 35.81.010.  
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B. Michigan’s Current Blighted Area Redevelopment Act 
 The current Michigan Blight Statute was originally enacted in 1945.113  Revisions were 
made in 1986, but were merely to update language.   The Michigan Statute is a single factor test, 
which means that it only relies on a finding of one factor to reach a blight designation.114   The 
legislature, essentially presumptively concludes on behalf of the municipality that any finding of 
blighted conditions compels a finding that blight impairs taxable and economic values, and that 
private development is infeasible or unavailable.115.  
 The Michigan statute then sets out the many factors that can constitute blight.  Not only is 
the statute single factor, but the statute also encompasses redevelopment for differing levels of 
blight, including moderate, and commands that a finding of blight be broadly construed.  The 
second section sets out blighting factors.  
Sec 2. As used in this act:116  
(a) “Blighted area means a portion of a municipality, developed or underdeveloped, improved 
or unimproved, with business or residential uses, (1) marked by a demonstrated pattern of 
deterioration in physical, economic, or social conditions, and characterized by such conditions 
as (a) functional or economic obsolescence of buildings or the area as a whole, (b) physical 
deterioration of structures substandard building or facility conditions, (c) improper or 
inefficient division or arrangement of lots and ownerships and streets and other open spaces, 
(d) inappropriate mixed character and uses of the structures, (e) deterioration in the condition 
                                                 
113 Michigan Blighted Areas Redevelopment Act 1945 P.A. 344.  Michigan’s “Uniform” Condemnation Procedures 
Act was enacted in 1980. 87 P.A. 1980, M.C.L. 213.55.  
114 See section II infra.  
115 
 Section One: The legislature finds and declares that large areas in the municipalities have become blighted 
and significant areas in the municipalities of the state are deteriorating in a manner which leads to severe 
blight with the consequent impairment of taxable values upon which in large part, municipal revenues 
depend; that those blighted areas are detrimental or inimical to the health safety, morals, and general 
welfare of the citizens, and to the economic welfare of the municipality; that in order to improve and 
maintain the general character of the municipality, it is necessary to rehabilitate those blighted areas; that 
the conditions found in blighted areas cannot be remedied by the ordinary operations of private enterprise, 
with due regard to the general welfare of the public, without public participation in the planning, property 
acquisition or disposition, and related implementation and financing of the remedies; that the purposes of 
this act are to rehabilitate those areas by improving or acquiring and developing properties within the areas 
and that the necessity in the public interest for provisions enacted in here is hereby declared as a matter of 
legislative determination to be a public purpose and a public use.  
M.C.L.§ 125. 71.  
116 Numbers inserted by author.  
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of any public facilities or services or any other similar characteristics which endanger the 
health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the municipality, and which may include any 
buildings or improvements not in themselves obsolescent and (2) any real property residential 
or nonresidential, whether improved or unimproved, the acquisition of which is considered 
necessary for rehabilitation of the area. (3) It is expressly recognized that blight is observable 
at a stages of severity, and that moderate blight unremedied creates a strong probability that 
sever blight will follow. Therefore, the conditions that constitute blight are to be broadly 
construed to permit a municipality to make an early identification of problems and to take 
ready remedial action to correct a demonstrated pattern of deterioration and to prevent 
worsening of blight conditions.117   
 
 Unlike the multifactor tests, Michigan’s blight statute provides that findings of 
obsolescence of buildings, deterioration, improper or inefficient arrangement or ownership, 
character of structures, deterioration of public facilities to the health, safety and welfare of the 
public are demonstrative of degradation in social or economic conditions.118 There is not a 
separate requirement for one or the other.  
 In 2002, the Michigan Legislature passed a new statute that essentially turned Michigan’s 
blight statute to a combination statute.119  The statute is focused on single properties, as opposed 
to areas for redevelopment. The statute provides relaxed requirements for properties other than 
industrial properties current on taxes, farms, railroad property and resident-owned single-family 
homes.120   The statute allows a declaration of “blighting,” of individual properties upon a 
finding that the property is any one of the following: a public nuisance, attractive nuisance, fire 
or other hazard, permanently disconnected utilities, structure is damaged to such an extent that it 
does not meet the local building codes, likely to fall, or is a dwelling and because of infestation is 
likely to cause sickness and disease.121. 
                                                 
117 M. C. L. § 125.72(a).  
118 § 125.72(a).  
119 Development of Blighting Property, 2002 P.A. 27, M.C.L. § 125.2801 (2005). AN ACT to establish procedures 
for municipalities to designate individual lots or structures as blighting; to purchase or condemn blighting property; 
to transfer blighting property for developing; and to repeal acts and parts of acts. Id.  
120  § 125.2801 (2005).  
121  
(i) The property has been declared a public nuisance in accordance with local housing, building, 
plumbing, fire, or other related code or nuisance.  
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 Although this statute offers some protection, through the exclusion of certain properties 
under its provisions, it still gives the municipality significant leeway.  Furthermore, it gives 
direct authority to turn the property over to developers. As with Michigan’s Blighting 
Rehabilitation Act, municipalities must only find one factor to obtain the “blighting” designation. 
Properties most affected by these provisions, including commercial properties, rental apartments 
and homes, have little protection from transfer of their property to a private developer.  However, 
one significant section contains a provision for attorneys’ fees. MCL 125.2806 provides:  
 
“If a person with a legal interest in a property that a municipality designates as 
blighting appeals the municipal decision and the decision is reversed by a court of 
appropriate jurisdiction and the court determines that the municipality was acting 
arbitrarily or in bad faith, the court may award the successful appellant the costs, 
including but not limited to, attorney fees, actually and reasonably incurred by the 
person in making the appeal.”  
 
 Finally, the legislature set forth condemnation procedures in the Uniform Condemnation 
Procedures Act122 The Act limits provides only limited procedural safeguards, which 
condemnees may inadvertently forfeit due to strict requirements and brief statutes of 
                                                                                                                                                             
(ii) The property is an attractive nuisance because of physical condition, use or occupancy. A 
structure or lot is not blighting property under this subparagraph because of an activity that is 
inherent to the functioning of a lawful business  
(iii) the property is a fire hazard or is otherwise dangerous to the safety of persons or property. 
(iv) The property has had the utilities, plumbing, heating or sewerage permanently disconnected, 
destroyed, removed, or rendered ineffective so that the property is unfit for its intended use.  
(v) A portion of the building or structure located on the property has been damaged by any event so 
that the structural strength or stability of the building or structure is appreciably less that it was before 
the event and does not meet the minimum requirements of the housing law of Michigan121 or a 
building code of the city, village, or township in which the building or structure is located for a new 
building or structure.   
(vi) A building or structure or part of a building or structure located on the property is likely to fall. 
Become detached or dislodged, or collapse and injury persons or damage property.  
(vii) A building or structure located on the property used or intended to be used as a dwelling, 
including the adjoining grounds, because of dilapidation, decay, damage, or faulty construction, 
accumulation of trash or debris; an infestation of rodents or other vermin; or any other reason, is 
unsanitary or unfit for human habitation, is in a condition that a local health officer determines is 
likely to cause sickness or disease, or is likely to injury the health, safety, or general welfare of the 
people living in the dwelling. 
§ 125.2801. 
122 1980 P.A. 280, M.C.L 213.55 (2005).  As an interesting aside, condemnation lawyers drafted the legislation and 
it is not “uniform” as there is no other act of the same nature within the United States.  
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limitation.123   In addition, the Act gives the municipality the right to request all tax records for 
the preceding five years for determining just compensation, or any other documents that the 
municipality deems necessary.124   Homeowners are sanctioned if these documents are not 
produced in a timely fashion.125  Challenges to just compensation must list specific detail and 
information for the agency to determine value.126  If the owner files a claim that is frivolous or in 
bad faith, the municipality has the right to collect reasonable expenses.127 No such similar 
provision is made on behalf of the property owner.  
III. RISING TO THE CHALLENGE: PROTECTING PROPERTY RIGHTS THROUGH 
NEW LEGISLATION 
 
 According to a recent study by the Institute for Justice, Michigan municipalities have 
filed a total of 138 condemnation actions with an end benefit to private parties and threatened 
173 actions.128  Michigan is among the highest in terms of private purpose condemnations filed, 
and Detroit is the worst offender among all cities in the nation.129   The abusive eminent domain 
tactics, fostered by Michigan’s current blight and condemnation statutes, will foreclose gains 
made in the protection of private property rights by the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in 
County of Wayne v. Hathcock.130     
 The slum-clearance movement initiated the erosion of public use.131  States were quick to 
jump onto the “slum-clearance” bandwagon, and those efforts became urban renewal.132 Urban 
renewal then evolved to its present state, where the Municipality, through its power of eminent 
                                                 
123 M.C.L. § 213.55(2) ; M.C.L. § 213.56 (7) (providing that “[i]f a motion to review necessity is not filed as 
provided in this section, necessity shall be conclusively presumed to exist and the right to have necessity reviewed 
or further considered is waived”).  
124 §  213.55(2). To obtain reimbursement, the homeowner must submit any costs incurred within 45 days. Id.  
125 §  213.55(2). 
126 § 213.55(3).  
127 § 213.55(3). 
128  BERLINER, supra note 4 at 2.  
129  Id.  
130  684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).  
131 See section II.B., infra.  
132 See section II.B. infra.  
 24
domain, forces thousands out of their homes, all in the name of large corporations and luxury 
condominiums masquerading as the public good.   As one author commented “If blight does not 
truly exist, then the “blighted” property is not necessarily being redeveloped to meet a public 
interest, it is merely being replaced with a more politically favored brand of development.”133 
Over inclusive blight statutes can retard important development and force municipalities to 
undergo unnecessary steps to accomplish their goals.134  Under-inclusive statutes fail to protect 
the rights of property owners.135    Faced with this choice, many commentators have proposed 
different options. Two of the most prevalent arguments including heightened judicial review, and 
increased compensation.  
A. Heightened Judicial Review  
 Many proponents of the protection of property rights argue that heightened judicial 
scrutiny on legislative pronouncements would solve the dilemma.136  In fact, several states 
require increased judicial scrutiny.137 A few Federal courts have determined that judicial 
deference under the federal constitution to legislative findings of blight is unnecessary when the 
blight determination is merely pretextual.138    
                                                 
133 Burling, supra note 98 at 50.  
134 LefCoe,  supra note 14.  
135 Burling, supra note 98 at 50.  
136 Kruckeberg, supra note 14 at 578; Nancy K. Kubasek, Time To Return to a Higher Standard of Scrutiny in 
Defining Public Use, 27 RUT. L. REC. 3 (2003).  
137 Cottonwood Christian Center v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency  218 F.Supp.2d 1203, 1228 (C.D.Cal.2002). “A 
second problem with Defendants' asserted justification is that the evidence does not necessarily support a finding of 
blight. Although the City asserts that its 1990 determination of blight is conclusive, examination of local laws under 
the strict scrutiny analysis requires not only that the government's stated purpose is a compelling interest, but that it 
is also a genuinely-held purpose.” Id. at 1228.  
138 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency  237 F. Supp.2d 1123, 1129 (C.D.Cal.2001). 
If officials could take private property, even with adequate compensation, simply by deciding behind closed 
doors that some other use of the property would be a 'public use,' and if those officials could later justify 
their decisions in court merely by positing 'a conceivable public purpose' to which the taking is rationally 
related, the 'public use' provision of the Takings Clause would lose all power to restrain government 
takings." Id. 
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 First, there is the traditional challenge, asserting that courts should not replace their 
judgment for that of the legislature.139 However, more importantly, judicial review is often too 
little, too late. Redevelopment projects are years in the making by the time they come to the 
courts. The blight or slum designation may be placed on the property years before condemnation 
proceedings even commence.140 This puts a substantial strain on property owners, fearful of 
loosing their homes.  Furthermore, the “cloud” of blight and slum designations also makes their 
property unmarketable during the challenge.141 Finally, some homeowners are just not 
financially able to challenge the designation.  Attorneys’ fees are steep, and many owners often 
just accept the blight designation and “just compensation” without challenge.142 Homeowners 
need to be protected earlier in the process, and only a tighter statutory scheme will accomplish 
this.   
B. Increased Compensation 
 In their Article, Public Ruses, Professors Krier and Serkin propose a sliding scale 
approach to compensation as a solution to the conundrum of what constitutes “public use”143 
According to Krier & Serkin, the difficulty with the current interpretation of “just compensation” 
is that it often results in under compensation, neglecting to account for the uncompensated 
increment.144   Subjective personal values, business good will, and other incidental benefits such 
as general increase in property values from the improvement, are not considered in valuation.145  
Under this new approach, compensation would range a depending on where it fell on a 
                                                 
139 James E. Krier & Christopher Serkin, Public Ruses, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 859, 864.  
140 See, e.g. Washington Market Enterprises v. Trenton, 68 N.J. 107, 343 A.2d 408 (1975). 
141 Id.  
142 Lefcoe, supra note 14 at 1026.  
143 Krier & Serkin, supra note 139.   
144 Id. at 867-68. Krier & Serkin derive the term “uncompensated increment” from Lee Anne Fennel, Taking 
Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MICH ST. L. REV. 957.  Professor Fennell describes three components of the 
uncompensated increment: “(1) the increment by which the property owner’s subjective value exceeds fair market 
value; (2) the chance of reaping a surplus from trade (that is of obtaining an amount larger than one’s own true 
subjective valuation; and (3) the autonomy of choosing for oneself when to sell. Id. at 958-959.  
145 Krier & Serkin, surpra note  139 at 867-68 
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continuum of uses, increasing from fair market value as the “use” moved along the scale from 
private use to naked transfer.146 The end effect gives the condemnee the ability to share in the 
benefits realized from the seizure of their property through eminent domain.147 
 The main problem with this approach, as Krier & Serkin themselves acknowledge, is that 
it is a liability rule rather than a property rule.148  “If A wants to buy B’s house, he has to 
negotiate with B and meet B’s price in order to close the deal-unless, of course, A is the 
government and wants B’s property for a public use. In that event, A can force a sale at a price 
determined not by B, but by a court.”149    The first example is one of a property rule, where an 
individual is prohibited from purchasing property without the assent of the owner.  In the second, 
the property owner is unable to prohibit the government from purchasing property, but will 
receive just compensation for what they have taken.  
 Liability rules serve several functions.150  Although tort law regulates behavior through 
litigation, its purpose is also to compensate those already injured.  The product has already 
injured the individual. The breach of contract caused significant incidental and consequential 
damages. The toxic dumping killed all of the fish in the stream.  There is not the ability to put the 
injured individual back in the place they were in before the harm occurred, so society provides a 
monetary solution.  Although liability rules force individuals to consider carefully their chosen 
actions, they do not act as the sole deterrent.151 Laws and regulations are also put in place to 
deter individuals before offensive conduct occurs.   The problem with relying solely on a liability 
                                                 
146 Id. at 867-68.  
147 Id. at 871. 
148 Id. at 873 (citing Guido Calabresi & Doublas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules , and Inalienability: One 
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).  
149 Krier & Serkin, supra note 137 at 873.  
150 Calebresi & Melamaed, supra note 144; Edward T. Schroeder,  A Tort By Any Other Name? In Search of the 
Distinction Between Regulation through Litigation and Conventional Tort Law.   
  83 Tex. L. Rev. 897, 897 (2003) (“[O]ne of the principal justifications for the tort system is that it acts as an 
efficient deterrent to breaches of the duty of care.”).  
151 Schroeder, supra note 146 at 898.  
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rule is that “efficient breach,” may still occur.152  If a liability rule imposes $2,000,000 in 
damages, but the party looks to gain $5,000,000 from the transaction, breaching the rule is the 
better option.  
 In the case of eminent domain, the legislature has the ability to prevent the conduct from 
the outset though use of a property rule.153  While creation of liability rules address the concerns 
raised from problems surrounding “just compensation” and the uncompensated increment, it 
does not solve the problem of the disingenuous blight designation.  Municipalities given free 
hand to utilize the police power to procure property through eminent domain will be able to find 
uses that, without review, are “justified” under the police power.    A tightly drafted statutory 
scheme coupled with a liability rule, however, may provide an ideal solution.   
C. Proposed Michigan Blight Rehabilitation Act  
 A successful attempt to prohibit legislative bodies from abusing their powers of eminent 
domain must be accompanied by legislatively imposed standards, both that give a reviewing 
court objective substantive and procedural guidelines.   The following proposed amendments to 
the Michigan Blight Rehabilitation act, although not guaranteed to protect from all abuses of 
eminent domain, will make it more difficult to use blight to offend the protections offered in 
article 10 of the Michigan Constitution and the Fifth Amendment.154  This proposed statute 
adopts the combination approach.155    
 
 
                                                 
152 See generally Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules,  79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1719 (2004) (addressing “ 
how pairing property rules with an exclusion strategy has advantages that stem from saving information costs, 
deterring opportunism by potential takers, and discouraging owners from engaging in wasteful self-help”).   
153 See generally, Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One 
view of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972).  
154 U.S. CONST. amend. V.; MICH. CONST. art 10 sec. 2.   
155 See section II, infra.  
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1. New Definition Section.  
  
 A first necessary step is a revision of the definitions of “slum” and “blight.”  The 
proposed statute adopts a separate multifactor test for slums and for blighted properties.   
Distinguishing between slums and blighted properties allows for a balance of promoting 
development, while protecting property rights.  Although it is the author’s belief that procedural 
safeguards will be the most beneficial, requiring a municipality to make specific findings as to 
the property gives a court a more complete record in the case of review.  Substitution of judicial 
findings is not favored, and as with administrative law, judicial review should remain 
concentrated on whether the municipality followed the requirements of the statute and whether 
its action was arbitrary and capricious or not supported by substantial evidence.  The following 
provisions attempt to achieve this balance.  
 
AN ACT to authorize counties, cities, villages and townships of this state to adopt plans to 
prevent blight and to adopt plans for the rehabilitation of blighted areas 
 
 
Section One DEFINITIONS: In this chapter  
 
“Blighted area”  
i. Means an area that, in its present condition and use and, by reason of the presence of 
at least three (4) of the following factors, substantially impairs or arrests the sound 
growth of the municipality, retards the provision of housing accommodations, or 
constitutes an economic or social liability, and is a detriment to the public health, 
safety, morals or welfare:  
a. Deteriorated, or deteriorating structures  
b. Predominance of defective or inadequate street layout;  
c. Faulty lot layout in relation to size, adequacy, accessibility, usefulness; 
d. Unsanitary or unsafe conditions  
e. Deterioration of site or other improvements;  
f. Unusual topography or inadequate public improvements or utilities;  
g. Defective or unusual conditions of title rendering the title nonmarketeable; 
h. The existence of conditions that endanger life or property by fire or other causes  
i. Buildings that are unsafe or unhealthy for persons to live or work in because of 
building code violations, dilapidation, deterioration, defective design, physical 
construction, or faulty or inadequate facilities 
j. Environmental contamination of buildings or property; 
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k. The existence of health, safety, or welfare factors requiring high levels of 
municipal service or substantial physical underutilization or vacancy of sites, 
buildings, or other improvements; or 
l. If there is no objection by the property owner or owners and the tenant or tenants 
of such owner or owners, if any, to the inclusion of such property in an urban 
renewal area, “blighted area” also means an area that, in its present condition 
and use and by reason of he presence of any one of the factors specified in 
paragraphs (a) to (K) of this subsection (2), substantially impairs or arrests the 
sound growth of the municipality, retards the provision of housing 
accommodations, or constitutes an economic or social liability, and is a menace 
to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare.156  
 
“Slum area” 
i.  Means an area in which  
a. by reason of  
i. extreme dilapidation, deterioration,  
ii. age or obsolescence,  
iii. inadequate provision for ventilation, light, sanitation, or open spaces,  
iv. high density of population and overcrowding, or any combination of such 
factors 
b. the area 
i.  is conductive to ill health, transmission of disease, infant mortality, juvenile 
delinquency or crime,  
ii. constitutes an economic or social liability 
iii. and  is a menace to the public health, safety, morals or welfare.157  
 
2. Added Procedural Safeguards  
 
 This added section provides new procedural safeguards for property owners.  For owners 
of proposed slum or blighted property, the municipality must put the question to the voters 
following a determination that a particular portion of the property in question is blighted, or 
contributes to the blight.  For blighted areas, the required fraction of the property under the 
condition is 2/3. For slums, this number is decreased to 1/2 to allow a municipality to redress 
more substantial problems on an expedited basis.  
 
Section 2  PROCEDURES  
 
                                                 
156 Colorado Stat. 31-25-103.  
157 Colorado Stat. 31-25-103. 
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No agency may acquire title to any land for the purpose of carrying out a development plan 
unless the following conditions have been met.158 
 
1. In the case of a slum  
1. No such area shall be subject to the power of eminent domain, within the 
meaning of this article unless  
1. it is determined by the planning commission that at least one half (1/2) 
of the number of buildings within the area or of the character described 
in this subdivision and substantially contribute to the conditions making 
such area 
2. the governing body of the municipality adopts a resolution that finds that 
a slum area exists in the municipality and that the rehabilitation, the 
conservation, or the slum clearance and redevelopment of the area is 
necessary as described.  
3. a majority of the municipality’s voters voting in an election held as 
provided by subsection (2) favor adoption of the resolution 
2. Before adopting the resolution, the governing body must give notice of the 
proposed resolution and must hold an election on the question. The notice must 
be published at least twice in the newspaper officially designated by the 
governing body and must state that, on a date that is specified in the notice and 
that is after the 60th day after the date the notice is first published, the governing 
body will consider the question of holding an election to determine whether it 
should adopt the resolution.  On the date specified in the notice to consider the 
question, the governing body may order an election on its own motion to 
consider the resolution. The governing body shall order an election on the date 
in question if it receives a petition during the notice period that is signed by at 
least five percent of the qualified voters of the municipality. 
3. If a majority of the voters voting in the election are against the resolution, the 
governing body may not adopt it and may not propose the resolution again for a 
one-year period.159  
 
 
2. In the case of a blighted area  
 
1. No such area shall be subject to the power of eminent domain, within the 
meaning of this article unless  
1. It is determined by the planning commission that at least two thirds (2/3) 
of the number of buildings within the area or of the character described 
in this subdivision and substantially contributes to the conditions making 
such area.  
2. the governing body of the municipality adopts a resolution that finds that 
a blighted area exists in the municipality and that the rehabilitation, the 
conservation, and redevelopment of the area is necessary as described 
below.  
                                                 
158 Kent. Gen. Stat. 99.370.  
159 Tex Gen. Stat § 374.002 
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3.  a majority of the municipality’s voters voting in an election held as 
provided by subsection (2) favor adoption of the resolution 
2. Before adopting the resolution, the governing body must give notice of the 
proposed resolution and must hold an election on the question. The notice must 
be published at least twice in the newspaper officially designated by the 
governing body and must state that, on a date that is specified in the notice and 
that is after the 60th day after the date the notice is first published, the governing 
body will consider the question of holding an election to determine whether it 
should adopt the resolution.  On the date specified in the notice to consider the 
question, the governing body may order an election on its own motion to 
consider the resolution. The governing body shall order an election on the date 
in question if it receives a petition during the notice period that is signed by at 
least five percent of the qualified voters of the municipality. 
3. If a majority of the voters voting in the election are against the resolution, the 
governing body may not adopt it and may not propose the resolution again for a 
one-year period.160  
 
3. Post Designation Safeguards  
 
 Under the final section, a property owner is given several opportunities to challenge the 
blight designation, and provided review by a circuit court.  In addition, a cause of action is given 
to the Michigan Attorney General.161  A challenger has 120 days to appeal, which assures that 
the property has sufficient time to mount a challenge. The section provides for notice and 
opportunity to be heard at the designation hearing. Following the hearing, property owners may 
appeal a designation they believe in error to the circuit court for review.  If the circuit court, or 
higher appellate court, determines that the municipality acted arbitrarily or in bad faith in 
designating the property as slum or blighted, the court must award the successful challenger all 
costs, including attorneys fees.  
 
 
                                                 
160 Tex Gen. Stat § 374.002 
161 Under a California proposal, an office of State redevelopment review authority, within the office of Attorney 
General, would be established to police redevelopment within the state. This authority is funded by fees charged to 
local redevelopment authorities. All new redevelopment proposals would be subject toe review by the attorney 
general, who also had a cause of action to challenge such designations.  See Lefcoe, supra note 14 at 1027.  While 
development of such an authority is outside the scope of this comment, the author believes that this would also 
prove to be an exceptional tool to balance the needs of the public with the rights of property owners.  
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Section 3 DESIGNATION CHALLENGE  
 
1.  A person with a legal interest in the in the property or a representative of the office 
of the Michigan Attorney General may contest the proposed designation of any 
property as slum or blighted at the hearing held by the municipality under section 4 
by doing 1 of the following: 
a. Appear at the hearing and show cause why the property should not be designated 
as slum or blighted 
b. If incarcerated, impaired, or otherwise unable to attend a public hearing, submit 
a written presentation to show cause why the property should not be designated 
as slum or blighted.  
2. If a person with a legal interest in the property demonstrates at the hearing that 
improvements to the property have been made or are actively being made that will 
cause the property to no longer meet the definition of slum or blighted, the 
municipality shall delay the designation of the property as slum or blighted for 91 
days. If, at the end of that 91 days the municipality finds that the property no longer 
meets the definition of slum or blighted property, the municipality shall issue a 
certificate stating that the property is not a slum or blighted.  
3. If after the notice and hearing required by this act the municipality determines that 
the property is slum or blighted property, the municipality shall designate the 
property as slum or blighted and provide public notice of the designation.  
4. A municipality may at any time suspend proceedings leading to the designation of 
property as slum or blighted if a person with a legal interest in the property enters 
into an agreement with the municipality establishing an improvement plan for the 
property and a schedule for completion of the improvements.  
5. A person with a legal interest in property or representative of the office of the 
Michigan Attorney general that a municipality has designated as slum or blighted 
property may appeal that decision to the circuit court in the jurisdiction within which 
the property is located within 120 days of the designation. The circuit court shall 
review the municipal decision using the standard of review for administrative 
decisions that is set forth in section 28 of article VI of the statue constitution of 1963. 
6. If a person with a legal interest in a property that a municipality designates as slum 
or blighted property appeals the municipal decision and the decision is reversed by a 
court of appropriate jurisdiction and the court determines that the municipality was 
acting arbitrarily or in bad faith, the court shall award the successful appellant the 
costs, including but not limited to attorneys fees, actually and reasonably incurred by 
the person in making the appeal162                                                                                                          
           
 
CONCLUSION 
  Michigan’s current blight statute, and the ideas surrounding its adoption, is outdated.   
One or two room windowless tenements, outhouses, widespread disease and other problems 
                                                 
162 Mich Stat. 125. 
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facing developers in the 1930’s and 1940’s are not present.    Although removal of slums and 
blighted areas can be an important community service, the practice can also seriously impair the 
rights of property owners. Adopting a new statute with added procedural safeguards will limit 
municipalities’ ability to act as the “super developers” they have become. Requiring that 
municipalities make more detailed findings, and putting the question to the voters assures that 
the communities affected have sufficient input in the decision.  
 Not all, however, would agree. A recent article criticizing California’s redevelopment 
scheme adopted in 1993 asserted that “restrictive definitions endure property owners with a de 
facto veto of some redevelopment projects, enabling them to extract far more that “just 
compensation.”163 This, however, is the very purpose of tightly drawn restrictive blight statutory 
schemes. The more attenuated the blight designation, the more the government should have to 
pay. If blight was truly present, the municipality could proceed with condemnation and allow the 
jury to determine just compensation  
 Property Owners, like KTS Industries, should not be forced to endure condemnation for 
redevelopment based on disingenuous blight designations. Although other proposals such as 
increased compensation and heightened judicial review may protect property owners from the 
actions of municipalities, like Kalamazoo, these protections come too late in the process. 
Property owners need tools to fight municipalities earlier in the process. The foregoing proposal 
attempts to address this concern through addition of many procedural safeguards. The Michigan 
Supreme Court righted its wrongs with its decision in County of Wayne v. Hathcock.  Michigan 
legislators, now it’s your turn.  
                                                 
163 Lefcoe, supra not 14 at 1008.  
